Review of Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant\u27s Ethics (1994) by van der Linden, Harry
Butler University 
Digital Commons @ Butler University 
Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS College of Liberal Arts & Sciences 
1997 
Review of Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant's Ethics 
(1994) 
Harry van der Linden 
Butler University, hvanderl@butler.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers 
 Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
van der Linden, Harry, "Review of Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant's Ethics (1994)" Kant-Studien / 
(1997): 350-353. 
Available at https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers/41 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences at Digital 
Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS by an 
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact 
digitalscholarship@butler.edu. 
Permission to post this publication in our archive was granted by the 
copyright holder, K. G. Saur Verlag - ein Imprint der Walter de Gruyter 
GmbH & Co. KG (www.degruyter.com). This copy should be used for 
educational and research purposes only. 
 
The original publication appeared at: 
van der Linden, Harry. Review of Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to 
Kant's Ethics (1994), Kant-Studien 88 (1997): 350-53. 
 
DOI: not available 
350 Buchbesprechungen 
dieses zugleich zum spezifisch transzendentalen Bestimmen. So erreicht Vf. schlieB-
lich dennoch qua Topik den apodiktischen Charakter aller echten Transzendental-
philosophie! 
III. Aus Probe wie Gegenprobe folgt somit gleichermaBen, daB die Darleg~ngen 
des Vf. nicht den mindesten AufschluB uber Methode und Argumentation der tran-
szendentalen Erkenntnis zu geben vermogen. Ein Rekurs auf die fur "reputable Mei-
nungen" (S. 207) zustandige "Topik" kann allenfalls fur das Verstandnis der Diskus-
sionslage oder der kommunikativen Situation hilfreich sein, die zum einen Kants 
Unternehmen einer Kritik der reinen Vernunft veranla{5t, aber per se keineswegs 
philosophisch nezessitiert hat. Zum anderen mag sie als Instrumentarium gebraucht 
werden, den - unweigerlich faktisch-empirisch gepragten - Gang der Rezeption 
des Kritizismus zu beschreiben. Dabei konnte sie dann durchaus den Status reflexi-
ver Hermeneutik beanspruchen (vgl. KrV B 7661767, B 780). 
1m Zusammenhang mit den mitunter arg topischen Verlaufen der Rezeption sei-
ner kritischen Philo sophie hat ubrigens Kant gelegentlich seinen transzendentalen 
Ansatz uber den gelaufigen Standard der einfuhrenden Partien der Kritik der reinen 
Vernrenft hinaus erlautert. Dies geschieht vor allem in seiner Streitschrift gegen 
Eberhard (Uber eine Entdeckung, nach der aile neue Kritikder reinen Vernunft 
durch eine altere entbehrlich gemacht werden soli). Eine wirkliche Arbeit uber Me-
thode und Argumentation in Kants kritischer Philo sophie konnte sich - worauf 
etwa auch H. E. Allison hingewiesen hat - diese wertvollen Handreichungen zu-
nutze machen. 
So gehort Leitners Buch zur langen (und taglich wundersam wachsenden) Liste 
von Arbeiten, die ungeachtet ihrer durchaus zu wurdigenden Bemuhungen im Ein-
zeInen, das Ganze der Aufgabe verfehlt haben und verfehlen muBten, wei I sie durch 
fundamentale Ebenenverwechslung (hier sogar durch mehrfache) dem Kern des kri-
tizistischen Ansatzes nicht gerecht geworden - ja ihm sogar planmaBig ausgewi-
chen - sind. Diese viele auch bekannte Autorennamen umfassende Liste verdient 
die Gattungsbezeichnung "lectiones Kanti ut non-Kanti". Man kann diese auch als 
Variable lesen, denn mit anderen PhilosophiegroBen, etwa Wittgenstein und Heideg-
ger, wird eine ebenso muntere "doctrina ignorans" getrieben. 
Manfred Gawlina, Munchen und Neapel 
Roger]. Sullivan: An Introduction to Kant's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1994, viii + 183 pages. 
This solid but accessible and clearly-written introduction to Kant's ethics draws 
at times heavily from Sullivan's more technical and comprehensive Immanuel Kant's 
Moral Theory (1989). The introductory work, however, fully stands on its own 
with one unfortunate exception: Only citations from the Foundations of the Meta-
physics of Morals are referenced; with regard to all other citations from Kant's 
work, Sullivan states (p. 2) that the references can be found in the "relevant sec-
tions" of his 1989 work. What seems to have motivated Sullivan to adopt this 
reference procedure is that his exposition of Kant's ethics is centered around the 
. Foundations and aimed primarily at undergraduate students who are introduced to 
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Kant's moral theory through this book. Even so, the space saved does not seem 
worth the inconvenience created for students or other readers who on basis of 
Sullivan's text want to explore some specific aspects of Kant's work beyond the 
Foundations. 
Sullivan's book has ten short chapters. In the first chapter, he introduces Kant's 
moral theory on basis of his political theory, writing that this format "has proved 
extraordinarily helpful to my students in illuminating just those parts of Kant's 
moral theory that are usually the hardest for them to comprehend and appreciate" 
(p. 1). Sullivan describes Kant as a liberal thinker committed to the rule of law, the 
right of each individual to pursue his own conception of happiness, and the idea 
that each person has dignity based on his capacity for moral autonomy. Sullivan 
shows that Kant's liberal commitments led him to formulate the Universal Principle 
of Justice as the foundation of the good society, but, adhering to a formalist reading 
of Kant, he nonetheless claims that "an appeal to the principle of noncontradiction 
'" proves the correctness of the Universal Principle" (p. 13). He further character-
izes Kant as a classical liberal who viewed the task of the government as fundamen-
tally negative, apparently giving little significance to the latter's claim that it is the 
duty of the state "to maintain those members of the society who are unable to 
maintain themselves" (Ak VI, 326). 
Sullivan proceeds to sketch how Kant's liberal ideas shaped his moral thought. 
He also argues that the tyranny of Frederick the Great and Machiavelli's work 
significantly influenced Kant's moral thought. Here the links are less convincing or 
illuminating. Sullivan maintains, for example, that Kant learned from Machiavelli 
that "people have engaged in all sorts of conduct," and that, therefore, "moral 
norms cannot be based on experience" (p.22). A more serious problem is that 
Sullivan fails to make clear how his linking of Kant's political and moral thought 
is to be interpreted: Is it a reconstruction, a mere mode of exposition chosen for 
pedagogical purposes, or an account of how Kant's political convictions and experi-
ences actually informed his ethics? Sullivan seems to pursue all three, and this in-
vites misunderstanding. He rightly notes that the Universal Principle of Justice must 
bring harmony between human beings with diverse conceptions of happiness and 
that the categorical imperative in the Foundations has a similar purpose. However, 
it must be confusing for beginning students to read that "in the Foundations Kant 
restated [the Universal Principle of Justice] so it would apply not only to our beha-
vior but also to our aims and motives" (p. 28; my emphasis). 
Chapters 2 -6 discuss, respectively, Kant's explication and justification of the cat-
egorical imperative, the universal-law formula, the formula of respect for persons, 
the formula of the realm of ends, and the "limits of the categorical imperative." 
These chapters, with the exception of the last one, are primarily expository. In my 
view, a more critical approach is preferable. Of course, an introductory text should 
not so much engage in critical analysis that the main picture might be lost or that 
students are left wondering why they should study the philosopher under discus-
sion, but Sullivan at times ignores clear gaps or problems in Kant's arguments. Thus 
Sullivan simply restates, for instance, Kant's inadequate argument that since the 
good will is motivated by duty rather than by realizing some end of the inclinations, 
the good will must be guided by the universal-law formula of the categorical imper-
ative. Certainly, this argument must come as a surprise to students who define their 
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good character, say, in terms of a commitment to the Golden Rule or the Ten 
Commandments. Other examples are that Sullivan hardly addresses the many diffi-
culties involved in formulating maxims and that he does not assess Kant's doctrine 
of natural ends (teleology). A more critical approach, I think, would not only stimu-
late beginning students to become engaged in critical assessment of Kant's ethics, 
but would also provide an opportunity to discuss how Kant's work has led to a 
diverse Kantian tradition in ethics. 
In his discussion of the universal-law for~ula, Sullivan insists that the "ultimate 
moral norm is a purely formal law, completely empty of all content, ... showing 
its roots in the logical principle of noncontradiction" (p. 41). Relatedly, he claims 
that the denial of the moral law "results in a practical incoherency" (p. 35) and 
that even though "the Categorical Imperative requires us to assess the consequences 
of the adoption of a particular maxim, it is concerned only with the formal or 
logical consequences" (p. 51). Sullivan's use of the term "logical" is puzzling here, 
for in testing the universalizability of a maxim one must hypothetically consider 
what the empirical consequences of its universal adoption would be. Further, a 
"practical contradiction" emerges only if one accepts the idea that maxims should 
be universalizable and then proposes to act on a non-universalizable maxim. The 
person who rejects the universal-law formula altogether and acts on a non-univer-
salizable maxim is not engaged in a "practical absurdity" (p. 22). What needs to be 
shown is why we should be committed to this formula. What justifies the formula? 
Sullivan's introductory chapter provides an answer - the formula is the constitutive 
principle of the ideal community of free rational agents - but his formalist inter-
pretation prevents him from explicitly defending it. 
In the chapter on the "limits of the categorical imperative," Sullivan argues that 
"the Categorical Imperative does not offer us a recipe for making our specific moral 
decisions" (p. 94) and must instead be seen as a procedure for determining general 
moral rules that require moral judgment for their application to specific situations. 
One attractive feature of this interpretation is that it solves the problem of ethical 
rigorism: Moral rules are valid without exception, but in a particular situation one 
may judge that one rule overrides another relevant rule. Applying this insight to 
Kant's infamous On a SU12Posed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, it follows 
that the maxim of lying is always immoral, but we may lie in order to save a life. 
Sullivan adds: "The problem is that here, as elsewhere, Kant did not clearly distin-
guish between judging the moral quality of a maxim and judging how to act in a 
particular instance" (p. 103). Another strength of Sullivan's view of the limits of 
the categorical imperative is that it makes Kant's claim more plausible that the 
demands of morality are clear to common human reason. The claim applies only 
to general moral rules; error, moral disagreement, and the like, emerge primarily 
with respect to judgments of how to apply these rules (d. p. 105). One price paid, 
however, is that Sullivan significantly restricts the scope of Kantian ethics, especially 
since he denies the possibility of substantive Kantian guidelines for making particu-
lar moral judgments (see p. 39-41). 
Chapter 7 discusses how Kant developed the distinction between prudence and 
morality, while chapter 8 addresses his view of moral character, nonmoral feelings, 
and respect for the moral law and other moral feelings. Sullivan corrects in the 
latter chapter the wrong impression created by the Foundations that actions done 
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out of sympathy lack moral worth. Kant's real view is that those actions have worth 
if undertaken by a person who has made a basic commitment to the moral law. 
This commitment then plays the crucial role of constraining or re-directing natural 
sympathy where morally necessary, as in the case when compassion for someone 
might lead one to violate that person's autonomy (see p. 146). 
Chapter 9 offers an inventory of Kantian duties by addressing three questions: 
What is the ideal political society? What kind of person should we become? How 
should our personal relationships be? Sullivan sketches here the ideal Kantian agent 
as a very gradualist liberal thinker, who treasures friendship and marriage, pursues 
happiness within moral limits, and helps others in need. There is something funda-
mental missing from this picture: The Kant who was enthusiastic about the French 
Revolution, condemned colonialism with sarcasm, disapproved of both standing 
and paid armies, or held that all property is provisional until the realization of the 
federation of states. Admittedly, this radical dimension of Kant does not translate 
into specific duties in his work, but this is an issue that deserves to be discussed in 
an introductory text on his ethics. 
The final chapter of Sullivan's book analyzes the third section of the Foundations 
and is followed by "Suggestions for Further Reading." Sullivan notes that "[f]rom 
the very beginning, Kant's ideas engendered an enormous secondary literature as 
well as differing interpretations of those ideas" (p. 175); yet, he limits his suggested 
readings to recent works by Anglo-American scholars. 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, Sullivan's book would be a good addition to 
any course that discusses the Foundations in detail. The book will help students in 
understanding this difficult text and provide them with a broader and richer picture 
of Kant's ethics than they would obtain from the Foundations alone, for, where 
necessary, Sullivan pays ample and careful attention to such works as the second 
Critique, The Metaphysics of Morals, and Religion within the Limits of Reason 
Alone. 
Harry van der Linden, Indianapolis 
Markku Leppakoski: The Transcendental How. Kant's Transcendental Deduction 
of Objective Cognition. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International 1993, 
280 pages. 
This work is a doctoral dissertation defended in 1993 at the University of Stock-
holm. Its main topic is Kant's theory of synthetic judgments a priori. The central 
thesis which the author argues for is that Kant was largely interested in the question 
of how it is possible to establish or to justify some synthetic judgments in an a priori 
fashion. Leppakoski interprets this question to be a "how" -question in contrast to 
a "that"-question, and he holds that he is in accord here with Kant's own distinction 
between "how"- and "that"-questions (about which more below). Given this con-
viction, the title of this study is well chosen. The author believes that if transcenden-
tal idealism is true, then the answer to the pertinent "that" -question follows, i. e., 
the truth of Kant's idealism shows that some synthetic judgments are possible a 
priori. In contrast, to answer the corresponding "how"-question is to provide an 
account of how transcendental idealism can be established. 
